Bronx Baseball Bat & Ball Set

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For recognition, all incorrect reasoners’ responses were included in the analyses because their answers came in the form of a multiple-choice forced response. A mixed effects logistic regression (with subject as the random variable) was again conducted due to the dichotomous dependent variable (with or without “more than”). Once again, incorrect reasoners usually recognized the standard problem, but not the control, as containing “more than” (see Table 1), with this effect of condition significant, b = 3.00, odds ratio ( OR) = 20.07, χ 2 = 50.34, p< .001, 95% confidence interval ( CI) [8.76, 45.94]. Lichtenstein S, Fischhoff B, & Phillips LD (1982). Calibration of probabilities: The state of the art to 1980. In Kahneman D, Slovic P, & Tversky A (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 306–334). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [ Google Scholar] For the recall response, a mixed effects logistic regression (with subject as the random variable) was conducted due to the dichotomous dependent variable (with or without “more than”), considering only those participants who wrote down an answer that could be coded as with or without the “more than” phrase (e.g., “don’t know” responses were excluded). Incorrect reasoners usually recalled the standard problem, but not the control, as containing “more than” (see Table 1), with this effect of condition significant, b = 3.02, odds ratio ( OR) = 20.44, χ 2 = 21.69, p< .001, 95% confidence interval ( CI) [5.74, 72.75]. Mata A, Ferreira MB, Voss A, & Kollei T (2017). Seeing the conflict: An attentional account of reasoning errors. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24, 1980–1986. doi: 10.3758/s13423-017-1234-7 [ PubMed] [ CrossRef] [ Google Scholar]

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